The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment When Wealth is Unobservable by A. Mitchell Polinsky
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
THE OPTIMAL USE OF FINES AND IMPRISONMENT








This research was supported by the John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics at Stanford Law School.
I received helpful comments from Nuno Garoupa, Jason Johnston, Daniel Rubinfeld, Steven Shavell, Kathryn
Spier, and Robert Weisberg. The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and not necessarily those
of the National Bureau of Economic Research. 
©2004 by A. Mitchell Polinsky. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may
be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source.The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment When Wealth is Unobservable
A. Mitchell Polinsky
NBER Working Paper No. 10761
September 2004
JEL No. D31, D62, H23, K14, K42
ABSTRACT
This article studies the optimal use of fines and imprisonment when an offender’’s level of wealth
is private information that cannot be observed by the enforcement authority. In a model in which
there are two levels of wealth, I derive the optimal mix of sanctions, including the imprisonment
sentence  imposed  on  offenders  who  do  not  pay  the  fine  –  referred  to  as  the  “alternative”
imprisonment sentence. Among other things, I demonstrate that if imprisonment sanctions are used,
the optimal alternative imprisonment sentence is sufficiently high that high-wealth individuals prefer
to pay a fine exceeding the wealth level of low-wealth individuals and bear a lower (possibly no)
imprisonment sentence rather than to pretend to be low-wealth individuals. I also show that if the
optimal enforcement system would rely exclusively on fines when wealth is observable, the inability
to observe wealth is detrimental because higher fines then could not be levied on higher-wealth
individuals. In this case, it may be desirable when wealth is unobservable to impose an imprisonment
sentence on offenders who do not pay the fine – who will be low-wealth offenders – in order to
induce high-wealth offenders to pay the fine. However, if the optimal enforcement system would
employ both fines and imprisonment sentences when wealth is observable, the inability to observe
wealth is not detrimental. In this case, the same sanctions would be chosen if wealth is unobservable





polinsky@stanford.eduI.  Introduction 
  Individuals have many ways of hiding assets from government enforcers, including by 
hoarding cash, transferring assets to relatives or friends, or moving money to offshore bank 
accounts.  Notwithstanding these opportunities, prior analyses of optimal sanctions nearly always 
have assumed that an offender’s level of wealth is costlessly observable by the enforcement 
authority.  Knowing wealth levels, the enforcement authority then chooses the sanctions to 
impose, fines and/or imprisonment sentences.  The contribution of the present article is to 
consider optimal sanctions when an offender’s level of wealth is private information that cannot 
be observed by the enforcement authority.
1 
My analysis is based on a model in which there are two types of risk-neutral potential 
offenders — a low-wealth type and a high-wealth type.  If an offender is caught, he is sanctioned 
with a fine and, possibly, an imprisonment sentence.  If he claims that he cannot pay the fine 
because he is a low-wealth individual, a higher imprisonment sentence might be imposed on 
him — referred to as the “alternative” imprisonment sentence.  The enforcement authority’s 
problem is to choose the following policy instruments to maximize social welfare: the fine and 
imprisonment sentence for committing the offense; the alternative imprisonment sentence if an 
offender claims that he cannot pay the fine; and the probability of detecting the offense. 
The optimal enforcement system when wealth is unobservable takes one of three forms, 
depending on the cost of imprisonment.  At one extreme, if the cost of imprisonment is relatively 
low, it may be optimal to impose both fines and imprisonment sentences on offenders and to 
employ an alternative imprisonment sentence that is high enough so that high-wealth individuals 
                                         
1 I discuss in Section V the most relevant prior literature on this topic — Levitt (1997), Chu and Jiang 
(1993), and Polinsky (2004) — and how this article relates to it. 
  - 2 - prefer to pay the fine and bear the corresponding imprisonment sentence rather than to pretend to 
be low-wealth individuals.  At the other extreme, if the cost of imprisonment is sufficiently high, 
it will be optimal to rely exclusively on fines to sanction offenders; because wealth is 
unobservable, the fine cannot exceed the wealth level of low-wealth individuals.  An 
intermediate case also is possible, in which offenders who pay the fine are not also imprisoned, 
but those who do not pay the fine bear an (alternative) imprisonment sentence; in this case, too, 
the optimal alternative imprisonment sentence is high enough to discourage high-wealth 
individuals from pretending to be low-wealth individuals.  In each of these cases, I derive the 
optimal sanctions and discuss whether low-wealth and high-wealth individuals are underdeterred 
or overdeterred relative to the first-best outcome. 
  Perhaps surprisingly, I show that information about wealth levels may or may not be 
helpful.  The key point is that such information is useful only if the enforcement authority would 
want to impose higher sanctions on high-wealth individuals than on low-wealth individuals, for 
if this is the case, high-wealth individuals would pretend to be low-wealth individuals if wealth 
could not be observed.  Conversely, if the enforcement authority would want to impose lower 
sanctions on high-wealth individuals than on low-wealth individuals, high-wealth individuals 
will voluntarily bear such sanctions.  I show that both of these possibilities can occur. 
A notable result from my analysis is that, if wealth is unobservable, it may be worthwhile 
to use an alternative imprisonment sentence to induce high-wealth offenders to pay more than 
low-wealth offenders even if imprisonment is so costly that that it would not be used if wealth 
were observable.  In other words, when wealth is not observable, it may be desirable to impose a 
costly sanction — imprisonment sentences — on low-wealth offenders in order to better deter 
  - 3 - high-wealth offenders through a cheap sanction — fines.  If wealth were observable, it would not 
be necessary to incur this cost.  
Section II presents the general framework used in this article.  Section III derives the 
optimal enforcement system under different assumptions about the cost of imprisonment.  
Section IV compares the results to the case when wealth is observable.  Section V discusses the 
prior literature in relation to the analysis here.  Section VI considers various generalizations. 
 
II.  General Framework 
  In the model, individuals contemplate whether to commit an offense that causes harm.  
Each individual is identified by the benefit he would obtain from committing the offense and by 
his level of wealth.  For simplicity, I assume that there are two levels of wealth and that an 
individual’s benefit is independent of his wealth level.
2  An individual who commits the offense 
is detected with a probability that is determined by the enforcement expenditures of the state.
3  If 
detected, he may be sanctioned with a fine and/or an imprisonment sentence.  If he does not pay 
the fine, he may be subject to a higher alternative imprisonment sentence.  I assume for 
simplicity that individuals are risk neutral with respect to fines and imprisonment sentences, and 
that they bear the same disutility from a given sentence.
4  Fines are treated as socially costless 
                                         
2 I discuss in Section VI why my general results should continue to hold if there is a continuum of wealth 
levels.  
3 This probability is assumed to be independent of the individual’s level of wealth.  This makes sense in 
many, if not most, enforcement contexts. 
4 An individual who is risk neutral with respect to an imprisonment sentence only cares about the expected 
value of the sentence length.  I explain in Section VI why my general results would not be affected if individuals are 
not risk neutral with respect to fines or imprisonment sentences, or if they differ in terms of their disutility from time 
in prison. 
  - 4 - sanctions, while the cost of imprisonment to the state is assumed to be proportional to the length 
of the sentence. 
The following notation will be used.  
  h = harm caused if the offense is committed; h > 0; 
  b = benefit from committing the offense; b $ 0; 
  r(b) = probability density of b; r is positive for all b $ 0; 
  wL = level of wealth of low-wealth individuals; wL $ 0; 
  wH = level of wealth of high-wealth individuals; wH > wL; 
  θ = fraction of individuals with a low level of wealth; 
  e = enforcement expenditures of the state; e $ 0; 
  p(e) = probability of detection; p(0) = 0; p'(e) > 0; p"(e) < 0; 
  f = fine for committing the offense; f $ 0;
5 
  s = imprisonment sentence for committing the offense 
  if the fine f is paid; s $ 0; 
  sN  
                                        
= alternative imprisonment sentence for committing the 
  offense if less than f  is paid; sN     $ 0; and 
  c = cost to the state per unit of imprisonment sentence; c > 0. 
The state is assumed to know the distribution of wealth levels among the population, but not the 
wealth level of a particular individual.  Imprisonment sentences are measured in units of time 
such that one unit of an imprisonment sentence corresponds to one dollar’s worth of disutility to 
 
5 This is the nominal fine.  An individual might not have sufficient wealth to pay this fine. 
  - 5 - an individual.  Thus, an imprisonment sentence of length s imposes a cost on an individual equal 
to s. 
  Individual Behavior.  Let 
  bL = critical value of benefit below which a low-wealth individual will 
  not commit the offense and at and above which he will,
6 
and define bH analogously.  Thus, the higher bL or bH, the greater the level of deterrence. 
  If the fine f is less than or equal to a low-wealth individual’s level of wealth wL, then 
clearly everyone can be made to pay f and bear the imprisonment sentence s.  Any alternative 
imprisonment sentence sN    $ f + s will accomplish this.  In this case,  
bL = bH = p(e)(f + s).                                                           (1)  
If f exceeds wL, a low-wealth individual will not be able to pay the fine.  Such individuals 
can be made to pay wL, however, if the state threatens to impose a sufficiently high imprisonment 
sentence, say sN N   $ wL + sN   , on anyone who does not pay at least wL.  A low-wealth individual 
therefore will pay wL and bear the imprisonment sentence sN , in which case 
bL = p(e)(wL + sN                                                                                                                ).                                                                  (2) 
A high-wealth individual has the choice of paying the fine f and bearing the imprisonment 
sentence s,
7 or claiming that he is a low-wealth individual and paying wL and bearing the 
alternative imprisonment sentence sN  .  Hence, 
      bH = p(e)min(f + s, wL + sN  ).                                                           (3)                                                                                                                
                                         
6 I assume without loss of generality that he will commit the offense if he is indifferent. 
7 It is obvious that there is no advantage to the enforcement authority from setting the fine in excess of the 
wealth level of the high-wealth individuals. 
  - 6 - I assume without loss of generality that if f + s = wL + sN  , a high-wealth individual will pay the 
fine f and bear the imprisonment sentence s. 
  Social welfare.  Social welfare is the sum of the benefits obtained by individuals who 
commit the offense, less the harm done, less the private and public cost of imprisonment, and 
less the cost of detection.  It will be convenient to state social welfare in two cases. 
  If the fine f is less than or equal to wL, then social welfare is 
 
                                            4                                                              
I[b – h – p(e)(1 + c)s]r(b)db – e.                                                       (4) 
                                       p(e)(f + s) 
 
Everyone whose benefit equals or exceeds p(e)(f + s) commits the offense, resulting in a benefit 
b and a harm h.  With probability p(e) such individuals are detected and made to bear an 
imprisonment sentence s.  The social cost of imprisonment is the sum of the private cost s and 
public cost cs.  The state also incurs enforcement expenditures e.  The fines that individuals pay 
do not enter social welfare directly because they are transfer payments. 
  If the fine f exceeds wL and high-wealth individuals pay f, social welfare is 
 
                          4      
                        θI[b – h – p(e)(1 + c)sN   ]r(b)db  
                   p(e)(wL + s N                                                                                                                               )                                                
4                                                                                                                                     (5) 
                                              + (1 – θ)I[b – h – p(e)(1 + c)s]r(b)db – e.             
                                                                                  p(e)(f + s) 
 
The interpretation of (5) is the same as that of (4), though now low-wealth and high-wealth 
individuals face different sanctions because low-wealth individuals cannot pay f.
8 
  The state’s problem.  The state’s problem is to maximize social welfare through the 
choice of the fine f, the imprisonment sentence s, the alternative imprisonment sentence sN , and 
                                         
8 It is not necessary to state social welfare for the case in which f exceeds wL and high-wealth individuals 
pay wL; I demonstrate below that this case cannot occur in the optimal enforcement system. 
  - 7 - enforcement expenditures e.
9  Monetary payments by low-wealth and high-wealth individuals 
cannot exceed their respective levels of wealth.  I do not impose an upper bound on 
imprisonment sentences; it will be evident below that there is no reason to expect the optimal 
imprisonment sentences to be maximal, so any corner solution resulting from limiting 
imprisonment sentences would not be particularly interesting. 
Asterisks are used to denote the solution to the state’s problem, which I assume is unique.  
I also assume that some enforcement is optimal, that is, e* > 0; otherwise, the problem is 
uninteresting. 
  
III.  Analysis 
  There are three cases to consider, depending on whether imprisonment is used to sanction 
all offenders, or used just to sanction those who do not pay the fine, or not used at all.
10  In this 
section I describe the optimal enforcement system through propositions that correspond to these 
cases.  Following the proof of each proposition is an informal discussion of the results. 
  Proposition 1.  If the public cost of imprisonment c is sufficiently low, it may be optimal 
to use imprisonment both to sanction offenders who pay the fine as well as those who do not; that 
is, both s* and sN   *   may be positive.  In this case, 
(a) the optimal fine is maximal: f* = wH;  
(b) the optimal alternative imprisonment sentence (imposed if the fine is not paid) 
exceeds s*:  sN   *  > s*; 
                                         
9 Because my objective is to derive the socially optimal enforcement policy, I ignore the issue of whether 
the state’s policy is credible. 
10 Using imprisonment just to sanction offenders who pay the fine obviously is not feasible because then no 
one would pay the fine. 
  - 8 - (c) high-wealth individuals pay the fine f* rather than a payment equal to the wealth level 
of a low-wealth individual wL;  
  (d) the burden of the sanctions imposed on low-wealth individuals exceeds that imposed 
on high-wealth individuals: wL + sN   *   > f* + s*; and 
(e) both groups may be underdeterred or overdeterred. 
  Proof:  (i) I first show that if s* > 0, it must be that f* $ wL.  Suppose otherwise, that s* > 
0 and f* < wL.  Then it would be possible to raise f (with f remaining below wL) and lower s so as 
to keep f + s constant without affecting behavior, but raising social welfare by reducing the cost 
of imprisonment (see (4)). 
  (ii) Now suppose that s* > 0 and f* = wL.  This cannot be optimal either.  It would be 
possible to set sN  equal to s* and then raise f above wL and lower s by the same amount.  This 
would increase social welfare because neither group’s behavior would be affected, yet the cost of 
imprisoning high-wealth individuals would decline (see (5)). 
 (iii)  Hence,  if  s* > 0, it must be that f* > wL.  But if f < wH, social welfare can be 
increased by raising f and lowering s by the same amount, without changing sN       ; again, the cost of 
imprisonment declines for high-wealth individuals.  Hence, if s* > 0, it must be that f* = wH, 
establishing part (a). 
  (iv) To prove part (b), suppose the contrary, that sN   * < s*.  Then, since f* = wH > wL, 
high-wealth individuals would prefer to pay wL and bear the imprisonment sentence sN   *, the same 
sanctions borne by low-wealth individuals.  But this cannot be optimal by the type of argument 
used in step (ii).  This establishes part (b).  Part (c) follows from the same reasoning. 
  - 9 -   (v) I next show that if s* > 0, sN   *   and s* are such that wL + sN   *   > wH + s*.  If s* > 0, then 
the first-order condition with respect to s derived from (5) is, with f = wH and after dividing 
through by –(1 – θ)p(e), 
 (1  +  c)[1 – R(bH)] + [bH – h – p(e)(1 + c)s]r(bH) = 0,  (6)   
where bH = p(e)(wH + s).  The derivative of social welfare with respect to sN    is 
 – θp(e){(1 + c)[1 – R(bL)] + (bL – h – p(e)(1 + c) sN    )r(bL)}, (7) 
where bL = p(e)(wL + sN    ).  Consider this derivative at the value of sN   such that wL + sN     = wH + s*, 
that is, at sN    = s* + (wH – wL).  At this value of sN , (7) can be written as 
 – θp(e){(1 + c)[1 – R(bL)] + (bL – h – p(e)(1 + c)s*)r(bL)} 
(8) 
 +  θp(e)
2[(1 + c)(wH – wL)]r(bL), 
  
where bL = p(e)(wL + sN    ) = p(e)(wH + s*).  Since bL at this sN     equals bH at s*, (6) implies that the 
first term in (8) is zero.  The second term in (8) clearly is positive, so (8) is positive at sN   = s* + 
(wH – wL), implying that sN   *   > s* + (wH – wL) or, equivalently, wL + sN   *  > wH + s*.   This 
establishes part (d). 
  (vi) I next address whether individuals will be underdeterred or overdeterred relative to 
the first-best outcome.  First consider low-wealth individuals and the derivative of social welfare 
with respect to sN  (7).  Evaluated at sN    such that bL = p(e)(wL + sN    ) = h, it is clear that the sign of 
(7) is the same as the sign of p(e)sN   r(h) – [1 – R(h)].  The first term could be very low, for 
example if p(e) is low, in which case the sign of (7) would be negative; this implies that sN   should 
be chosen such that bL < h, resulting in underdeterrence.  Conversely, the second term could be 
very low — if R(h) is close to one — in which case the sign of (7) would be positive and bL 
would exceed h, so there would be overdeterrence.  Similar observations apply to high-wealth 
individuals.  This establishes part (e). 
  - 10 -   (vii) Finally, I demonstrate that there exists a sufficient condition for the optimal 
imprisonment sentence s* to be positive.  Given f* = wH, it can be shown from (5) that if the 
public cost of imprisonment c is zero, the derivative of social welfare with respect to s is positive 
at s = 0 if 
  h > wH + sup{[1 – R(pwH)]/r(pwH)}. (9) 
                                                              p 0 [0, 1] 
 
Thus, if (9) is satisfied and c is sufficiently low, s* > 0.▪ 
  It is obvious that it might be socially beneficial to use imprisonment despite its cost if the 
harm from the offense is sufficiently high.  For example, if the harm far exceeds the wealth level 
of high-wealth individuals, using fines alone will result in substantial underdeterrence even if 
detection is certain; the additional deterrence from employing imprisonment will be socially 
desirable if the cost of imprisonment is not too great.  Because the private cost of imprisonment 
per unit of deterrence is unavoidable,
11 this means that the public cost of imprisonment c must be 
sufficiently low. 
  That the fine should be maximal before imprisonment is used follows from well-known 
logic.  Specifically, since fines are socially cheaper sanctions than are imprisonment sentences, 
fines should be used to their fullest extent before the state resorts to using imprisonment. 
  The key insight from Proposition 1 is that the optimal alternative imprisonment sentence 
imposed on individuals who do not pay the fine is high enough to make high-wealth individuals 
prefer to pay the fine.  The reason it is optimal to impose such a high imprisonment sentence on 
individuals who do not pay the fine, all of whom are low-wealth individuals, can be explained as 
follows (in a way that parallels the proof).  Consider an alternative imprisonment sentence sN    
                                         
11 To create a dollar’s worth of disutility to an offender by imprisoning him necessarily causes a dollar’s 
worth of social cost. 
  - 11 - borne by low-wealth individuals that, combined with a monetary payment equal to their wealth 
level wL, creates the same degree of deterrence as for high-wealth individuals, given their 
payment of the fine f and bearing of the imprisonment sentence s.  Obviously, the imprisonment 
sentence borne by the low-wealth individuals must be higher.  Now raise the imprisonment 
sentence borne by each group.  The effect on social welfare from the additional deterrence is the 
same for each group since the level of deterrence initially is the same (and the distribution of 
benefits is assumed to be the same for both groups).  But because the imprisonment sentence 
borne by low-wealth individuals is longer, the social benefit of raising the imprisonment 
sentence is greater for them — society saves more on imprisonment costs for each low-wealth 
individual deterred from committing the offense.  Thus, it is optimal to impose a higher 
imprisonment sentence on low-wealth individuals than that which would equalize the deterrence 
of both groups.  Consequently, high-wealth individuals prefer to pay the fine and thereby bear a 
lower total burden from the combined sanctions. 
  The explanation why both groups may be underdeterred or overdeterred is based on a 
familiar argument.  Consider low-wealth individuals first, and suppose that their monetary 
payment and the (alternative) imprisonment sentence applicable to them are such that their 
expected combined sanction equals the harm.  If the imprisonment sentence is raised, there is no 
first-order effect on social welfare with respect to the benefit and harm from committing the 
offense because the marginal individuals who are deterred from committing the offense were 
obtaining a benefit equal to the harm.  But raising the sentence does have two effects on the cost 
of imprisonment.  On one hand, the cost of imprisonment tends to increase because those 
individuals who continue to commit the offense now bear a longer sentence if they are detected.  
On the other hand, the cost of imprisonment tends to decrease because fewer individuals commit 
  - 12 - the offense and serve imprisonment sentences.  Either effect could dominate, possibly making it 
desirable to raise the imprisonment sentence — resulting in overdeterrence — or to lower the 
imprisonment sentence — resulting in underdeterrence.  Analogous observations apply to high-
wealth individuals. 
  The next proposition addresses the case in which offenders who pay the fine are not also 
subject to an imprisonment sentence, but offenders who do not pay the fine do bear an 
imprisonment sentence. 
Proposition 2.  It may be optimal to use imprisonment only to sanction offenders who do 
not pay the fine; in other words, it is possible that s* = 0 and  sN   *    > 0.  In this case, 
(a) the optimal fine exceeds the wealth level of low-wealth individuals but might not be 
maximal: wL < f* # wH; 
(b) high-wealth individuals pay the fine f* rather than a payment equal to the wealth 
level of a low-wealth individual wL; 
(c) the burden of the sanctions imposed on low-wealth individuals equals or exceeds that 
imposed on high-wealth individuals: wL + sN   * $ f*; and 
(d) both groups may be underdeterred, but only low-wealth individuals may be 
overdeterred. 
Proof:  (i) I first show that if s* = 0 and  sN   *   > 0, it must be that f* > wL.  Suppose 
otherwise, that s* = 0, sN   *   > 0, and f* # wL.  Given these sanctions, both groups pay f* and do not 
bear an imprisonment sentence.  Any value of sN , including sN            = 0, would result in the same 
outcome, contradicting the uniqueness of sN   *.  Hence, if s* = 0 and  sN   *   > 0, it must be that f* > 
  - 13 - wL.  That f* can be less than wH is demonstrated in the analytical example in step (v) below; this 
example also can be modified to show that f* = wH is possible.
12  This establishes part (a). 
(ii) Suppose, given s* = 0, sN   *   > 0, and f* > wL, that high-wealth individuals prefer to pay 
wL and bear the imprisonment sentence sN   *.  In other words, suppose wL + sN   *   < f*.  Then both 
groups would be paying wL and bearing the sentence sN   *.  This cannot be optimal because it 
would be possible to improve social welfare by lowering f to wL + sN   *, in which case high-wealth 
individuals now pay f and are deterred to the same extent, and the cost of imprisonment declines 
because they no longer bear imprisonment sentences.  This proves part (b). 
(iii) The prior step showed that wL + sN   *   < f* cannot hold.  Hence, it must be that wL + sN   * 
$ f*.  The analytical example in step (v) below shows that strict inequality can occur.  I show 
here that equality also is possible.  The derivative of social welfare with respect to s derived from 
(5) is 
 –(1  –  θ)p(e){(1 + c)[1 – R(bH)] + [bH – h – p(e)(1 + c)s]r(bH)}, (10) 
where bH = p(e)(f + s).  Since s* = 0, (10) must be non-positive at s = 0, which implies that 
 (1  +  c)[1 – R(bH)] + [bH – h]r(bH) $ 0,  (11) 
where bH = p(e)f.  The derivative of social welfare with respect to sN   is (7), where bL = p(e)(wL +  
sN    ).  Consider this derivative at the value of sN   such that wL + sN   = f*, that is, at sN   = f* – wL.  At this 
value of sN  , (7) can be written as 
 – θp(e){(1 + c)[1 – R(bL)] + (bL – h)r(bL)} 
(12) 
 +  θp(e)
2[(1 + c)( f* – wL)]r(bL), 
  
                                         
12 See note 13 below. 
  - 14 - where bL = p(e)(wL + sN    ) = p(e)f*.  Since bL at this sN   equals bH at f*, (11) implies that the first 
term in (12) is non-positive.  The second term in (12) is positive.  If (12) is non-positive, then it 
will not be optimal to raise sN   above sN   = f* – wL.  A sufficient condition for (12) to be negative is 
that r(bL) is sufficiently low.  Then sN   *   = f* – wL, or wL + sN   * = f*.  Thus, wL + sN   * $ f* can hold 
with equality or strict inequality, proving part (c). 
  (iv) The logic used in step (vi) of the proof of Proposition 1 implies here as well that the 
low-wealth individuals can be underdeterred or overdeterred.  If they are underdeterred, then the 
high-wealth individuals also must be underdeterred because of part (c) of the present proposition.  
If the low-wealth individuals are overdeterred, however, it would never be optimal to set f such 
that the high-wealth individuals are overdeterred since f could be lowered to h/p(e), leading high-
wealth individuals to be first-best deterred. 
  (v) Finally, I provide an analytical example in which s* = 0 and  sN   *   > 0.  Suppose wL < h 
< wH and, for simplicity, that the probability of detection can be set at any level at no cost (this 
assumption is not essential).  Then, clearly, p(e*) = 1; this allows high-wealth individuals to be 
first-best deterred by setting f = h and results in low-wealth individuals being deterred to the 
greatest extent feasible by a monetary payment alone.  If high-wealth individuals can be first-
best deterred by a fine alone, the optimal imprisonment sentence would be s = 0.  Low-wealth 
individuals, however, would be underdeterred by a monetary payment alone because wL < h.  To 
see whether it is desirable to employ an alternative imprisonment sentence sN   sufficiently large so 
that high-wealth individuals prefer to pay f = h, consider the derivative of social welfare (5) with 
respect to sN   evaluated at sN   such that wL + sN   = h, that is, at sN   = h – wL.  Assuming that p = 1, this 
derivative is positive at sN  = h – wL if 
 ( h – wL)r(h) – [1 – R(h)] > 0.  (13) 
  - 15 - It is evident that (13) can be satisfied — for instance, if R(h) is sufficiently close to one — in 
which case sN   *   > h – wL.  High-wealth individuals therefore prefer to pay f* = h rather than wL +  
sN   *   > h.
13  Clearly, other examples in which s* = 0 and  sN   *   > h – wL could be constructed similar 
to this one even if it is costly to raise the probability of detection.▪ 
  That this case can occur should not be surprising.  Because high-wealth individuals can 
be deterred by fines to a greater extent than low-wealth individuals, the value of deterring high-
wealth individuals further by imposing an imprisonment sentence on them is lower.  Thus, given 
the cost of imprisonment, it might not be worthwhile to impose an imprisonment sentence on 
high-wealth offenders who pay the fine, even though it may be desirable to impose an 
imprisonment sentence on low-wealth offenders who cannot pay the fine. 
  Although much of Proposition 2 parallels Proposition 1, there are three notable 
differences.  First, the optimal fine no longer is necessarily maximal.  It is maximal in the case 
described by Proposition 1 because high-wealth offenders are subject to an imprisonment term, 
and fines, being a socially cheaper sanction, should be used to the fullest extent possible before 
imprisonment is employed.  Here, high-wealth individuals do not bear an imprisonment 
sentence, so this argument does not apply.  It is possible, therefore, that the optimal fine is less 
than maximal.  For example, given the probability of detection, it might not be necessary to raise 
the fine to the maximal level in order to achieve first-best deterrence. 
  Second, while in Proposition 1 the burden of the sanctions imposed on low-wealth 
offenders strictly exceeds that imposed on high-wealth offenders, here they can be equal.  The 
                                         
13 To see that this example can be modified so that f* = wH, suppose that the probability of detection can be 
raised to h/wH < 1 at no cost, and that it is excessively costly to raise it higher; thus, p* = h/wH.  Then setting f = wH 
and s = 0 leads to first-best deterrence of high-wealth individuals since p*f = h, and analogous reasoning to that used 
in step (v) implies that wL + s N      *    > wH can hold, so high-wealth individuals again prefer to pay f*. 
  - 16 - earlier argument stemmed from the fact that when both low-wealth and high-wealth offenders 
are subject to imprisonment sentences, deterring a low-wealth offender generates greater savings 
in imprisonment costs because low-wealth offenders have to bear longer imprisonment sentences 
to achieve the same level of deterrence.  This argument is not applicable here because high-
wealth offenders are not subject to an imprisonment sentence.  Now, starting from a situation in 
which both low-wealth and high-wealth individuals are equally deterred, with an imprisonment 
sentence imposed only on low-wealth offenders, it may not be desirable to raise the 
imprisonment sentence (whether it is depends on the desirability of the additional deterrence, the 
imprisonment cost savings from the additional deterrence, and the additional imprisonment costs 
due to undeterred low-wealth offenders serving longer sentences).  If a higher imprisonment 
sentence is not desirable, then both groups will bear an equal burden from the sanctions.
14 
  Finally, while both groups could be underdeterred or overdeterred in the case examined 
in Proposition 1, here the high-wealth group never is overdeterred.  The only rationale for 
overdeterring either group is to reduce the burden of imprisonment costs by reducing the number 
of offenders.  Because high-wealth offenders here are not bearing an imprisonment sanction, this 
argument does not apply to them.  
  The last proposition considers the case in which fines alone are used.  Although the 
results are straightforward, I include this case for completeness. 
  Proposition 3.  If the public cost of imprisonment c is sufficiently high, it will be optimal 
to rely exclusively on fines to sanction offenders.  In this case, 
(a) the optimal fine equals the wealth level of low-wealth individuals: f* = wL;  
                                         
14 The low-wealth offenders cannot bear a lower burden, for then high-wealth offenders could not be 
induced to pay the fine f. 
  - 17 - (b) everyone pays the fine f*; and 
(c) both groups are underdeterred. 
  Proof: (i) I first show that it must be that f* $ wL.  Suppose otherwise, that f* < wL.  Then 
it would be possible to raise f and lower e so as to keep p(e)f constant without affecting behavior, 
but reducing enforcement costs.  If f > wL, high-wealth individuals would not pay f unless there is 
a positive alternative imprisonment sentence sN  , which would then be borne by low-wealth 
offenders, contradicting the premise that imprisonment costs make the imposition of 
imprisonment sentences socially undesirable.  This proves part (a). 
  (ii) Everyone can be made to pay f* = wL by the threat of an alternative imprisonment 
sentence sN  such that sN   $ wL.  Since no one actually bears this sentence, the premise of this 
proposition is not contradicted.  This establishes part (b). 
  (iii) The first-order condition for determining e* from (4) can be written as (h – 
p(e)f)[dR(p(e)f)/de] = 1, which implies that p(e)f < h, proving part (c). 
  (iv) Starting from the outcome when fines alone are used, the marginal benefit of 
additional deterrence due to the use of an alternative imprisonment sentence sN   is at most the 
harm h (it is h – p(e*)wL for each low-wealth individual deterred by the imposition of sN   and for 
each high-wealth individual deterred by setting f = wL + sN    ).  The marginal cost of employing an 
alternative imprisonment sentence, starting at sN   = 0, is θp(e*)(1 + c)[1 – R(p(e*)wL)].  Therefore, 
if the public cost of imprisonment c is high enough, the marginal cost of imprisonment at sN   = 0 
will exceed the marginal benefit of imprisonment, and it will be optimal to rely exclusively on 
fines to sanction offenders.▪ 
  It is not surprising that it will be socially desirable to rely exclusively on fines if the cost 
of imprisonment is sufficiently great.  The fine should be as high as possible because, by well-
  - 18 - known logic, this allows the probability of detection to be lowered, saving enforcement costs.  
But the fine cannot exceed the wealth level of low-wealth individuals because, to induce high-
wealth individuals to pay a higher fine, it would be necessary to impose an (alternative) 
imprisonment sentence on low-wealth individuals; by assumption, an imprisonment sentence 
would not be desirable, given its cost.  Given a fine equal to the wealth level of low-wealth 
individuals, everyone can be induced to pay the fine. 
The explanation why both groups are underdeterred is based on a familiar argument.  
Suppose that the probability of detection is such that the expected fine equals the harm.  If the 
probability is lowered, there is no first-order effect on social welfare due to the lower level of 
deterrence because the marginal individuals who are induced to commit the offense obtain a 
benefit equal to the harm.  But lowering the probability saves enforcement costs.  Hence, some 
underdeterrence is socially desirable. 
 
IV.  Comparison to the Case of Observable Wealth 
  If wealth is observable, the enforcement authority can choose the mix of sanctions for 
each group separately.  In particular, to induce high-wealth individuals to pay more than low-
wealth individuals, the enforcement authority no longer needs to employ an alternative 
imprisonment sentence and make the burden of the sanctions for low-wealth offenders at least as 
high as that for high-wealth offenders.  If the state can observe wealth, it can simply command 
that individuals in each group pay any amount up to their wealth level and bear any 
corresponding imprisonment sentence. 
It would seem, therefore, that information about wealth levels would be socially valuable.  
Perhaps surprisingly, I will show in this section that such information may or may not be helpful.  
  - 19 - The key point is that information about wealth is useful only if the enforcement authority would 
want to impose higher sanctions on high-wealth individuals than on low-wealth individuals, for 
if this is the case, high-wealth individuals would pretend to be low-wealth individuals if wealth 
could not be observed.  Conversely, if the enforcement authority would want to impose lower 
sanctions on high-wealth individuals than on low-wealth individuals, high-wealth individuals 
will voluntarily bear such sanctions.  The following propositions show that both of these 
possibilities can occur.
15 
  Proposition 4.  If wealth is observable, suppose that the optimal enforcement system 
would rely exclusively on fines to sanction offenders.  In this case, if wealth is not observable, 
  (a) social welfare would be lower; and 
  (b) the optimal enforcement system might rely exclusively on fines; or 
  (c) the optimal enforcement system might employ alternative imprisonment sentences as 
well as fines. 
  Proof:  (i) Let fL and fH be the fines paid by low-wealth and high-wealth individuals, 
respectively, when wealth is observable.  I show in this step that fL * = wL.
16  Assume, to the 
contrary, that fL * < wL, and first suppose that fH * < wH.  Then there would exist a p(e) < p(e*), an fL 
> fL *, and an fH > fH * such that p(e)fL = p(e*)fL * and p(e)fH = p(e*)fH *.  Since the behavior of low-
wealth and high-wealth individuals will not have changed, but enforcement costs will have 
declined, fL * < wL could not have been optimal.  Now suppose that fL * < wL and fH * = wH.  Observe 
                                         
15 The first proposition below corresponds to Proposition 3, in which fines are used alone, while the second 
proposition below corresponds to Proposition 1, in which an imprisonment sentence and a monetary sanction are 
imposed on both low-wealth and high-wealth offenders.  For brevity, I do not consider the case corresponding to 
Proposition 2, in which an imprisonment sentence and a monetary sanction are imposed on low-wealth offenders, 
but only a fine is imposed on high-wealth offenders.  In this case, information about wealth may or may not be 
valuable, essentially for the reasons illustrated by the other cases. 
  - 20 - first that it must be that p(e*)fH * # h; otherwise, the resulting overdeterrence could be eliminated 
at no cost by reducing fH.  Since wL < wH, it must be that p(e*)wL < h.  Thus, the underdeterrence 
associated with fL * < wL could be reduced at no cost by raising fL, contradicting the presumed 
optimality of fL *.  Hence, it must be that fL * = wL. 
  (ii) I demonstrate in this step that fH * > wL.  Assume otherwise, that fH * # wL.  Suppose first 
that fH * < wL.  Note that p(e*)fL * = p(e*)wL # h, since otherwise the resulting overdeterrence of 
low-wealth individuals could be eliminated at no cost by reducing fL.  This implies that p(e*)fH * < 
h.  But then the underdeterrence of high-wealth individuals could be eliminated at no cost by 
raising fH, contradicting the presumed optimality of fH * < wL.  Now suppose fH * = wL.  Then by 
step (iii) of the proof of Proposition 3, p(e*) must be such that p(e*)wL < h.  But this implies that 
the underdeterrence of the high-wealth individuals could be reduced at no cost by raising fH, 
contradicting the presumed optimality of fH * = wL.  Therefore, fH * > wL. 
  (iii) If wealth is not observable, it is now straightforward to see that social welfare must 
be lower than when wealth is observable.  If fines are used alone when wealth is not observable, 
recall from Proposition 3 that all offenders pay f* = wL.  This outcome is feasible when wealth is 
observable and fines are used alone, but step (ii) shows that it is not optimal.  If imprisonment 
sentences are used when wealth is not observable, the resulting outcome also must be inferior 
because the same outcome could have been chosen when wealth is observable, but the premise of 
the present proposition is that the optimal enforcement system when wealth is observable relies 
exclusively on fines.  This establishes part (a). 
  (iv) Clearly, part (b) holds if the public cost of imprisonment c is sufficiently high. 
                                                                                                                                   
16 The results in this and the next step were demonstrated by Polinsky and Shavell (1984, pp. 96-97).  
Because the proofs are short, I reproduce them here for completeness. 






U be the limiting values of social welfare 
as the fraction of low-wealth individuals θ goes to zero when, respectively, wealth is observable 
and fines are used alone, wealth is unobservable and fines are used alone, and wealth is 











O since, if wealth is unobservable, all offenders 
pay a fine of wL, whereas if wealth is observable, high-wealth offenders pay a fine of fH * > wL.  If 
wealth is unobservable and an alternative imprisonment sentence is used, set sN   =  fH * – wL and f = 
fH *.  High-wealth offenders will pay f = fH * (since f = wL + sN    ) while low-wealth offenders will pay 
wL and bear an imprisonment sentence of sN   =  fH * – wL.  In the limit, as θ goes to zero, the cost of 
imprisonment goes to zero.  Thus, if the enforcement authority picks the same probability of 




O.  This result 
holds regardless of the public cost of imprisonment c.  Thus, even if fines are used alone when 
wealth is observable because of the high cost of imprisonment, it will be optimal to employ an 
alternative imprisonment sentence when wealth is unobservable if θ is sufficiently low.
17  This 
proves part (c).▪ 
  A notable aspect of the present proposition is that, if wealth is unobservable, it may be 
worthwhile to use an alternative imprisonment sentence to induce high-wealth offenders to pay 
more than low-wealth offenders even though imprisonment is so costly that that it would not be 
used if wealth were observable.  In other words, when wealth is not observable, it may be 
desirable to impose a costly sanction — imprisonment sentences — on low-wealth offenders in 
                                         
17 There is no inconsistency between the premise of Proposition 3 — that if the public cost of imprisonment 
c is sufficiently high, it will be optimal to rely exclusively on fines — and the result here that if the fraction of low-
wealth individuals θ is low enough, it will be optimal to employ an alternative imprisonment sentence regardless of 
the cost of imprisonment.  The premise of Proposition 3 involves raising c, holding θ constant, whereas the claim 
here involves lowering θ, holding c constant. 
  - 22 - order to better deter high-wealth offenders through a cheap sanction — fines.  If wealth were 
observable, it would not be necessary to incur this cost.  
  Proposition 5.  If wealth is observable, suppose that the optimal enforcement system 
would rely both on imprisonment sentences as well as fines to sanction offenders.  In this case, if 
wealth is not observable, 
  (a) social welfare is not affected; and 
  (b) the optimal enforcement system is the same. 
  Proof:  Let sL and sH be the imprisonment sentences borne by low-wealth and high-
wealth individuals, respectively, when wealth is observable.  The premise of this proposition is 
that sL * > 0 and sH * > 0.  Clearly, then, it must be that fL * = wL and fH * = wH (or the fine could be 
raised and the imprisonment sentence lowered).  The argument used in step (v) of the proof of 
Proposition 1 implies that wL + sL * > wH + sH *.  Hence, when wealth is not observable, if s = sH *, sN     
= sL *, and enforcement expenditures are the same as those made when wealth is observable, the 
outcome can duplicate that when wealth is observable.  Clearly, this is the social-welfare-
maximizing outcome when wealth is unobservable, proving parts (a) and (b).▪ 
 
 V.  Prior Literature 
To my knowledge, the only prior article to have systematically studied optimal sanctions 
under the assumption that an offender’s level of wealth is unobservable is Levitt (1997).
18  His 
model differs in significant respects, however, from mine.  In Levitt’s framework, “rich” and 
                                         
18 Several articles have studied optimal sanctions when variations in wealth are assumed to be costlessly 
observable.  See Friedman (1981), Polinsky and Shavell (1984, pp. 95-98), Polinsky and Shavell (1991), and 
Garoupa (1998, pp. 484-87).  (Garoupa examines the case in which the enforcement authority costlessly observes an 
underestimate of individuals’ wealth levels.) 
  - 23 - “poor” individuals are distinguished not in terms of their wealth levels (both types are assumed 
to be capable of paying any fine the state imposes), but instead in terms of their disutility from 
time in jail (rich individuals suffer greater disutility).  He also assumes that the benefit from 
committing the offense is the same for every individual of a given type, but differs between the 
types, and that the benefit is less than the harm from the offense, so that ideal deterrence involves 
complete deterrence.  In his formal analysis, Levitt considers the choice between an 
imprisonment sentence and a fine, not the optimal combination of the two, as I do here (though 
he does discuss this issue informally).  My results show that whenever imprisonment sanctions 
are employed, monetary sanctions should  be too. 
  Levitt’s main point is that, in contrast to the situation when individuals’ wealth levels can 
be costlessly observed, the availability of fines as an alternative to imprisonment might not result 
in higher social welfare.  This is because, in his analysis, the introduction of a fine as an 
alternative to a jail term cannot increase deterrence — if the fine were more burdensome, the 
offender would choose the jail term.  Consequently, Levitt suggests that the case for using 
imprisonment sentences as sanctions is stronger than is generally appreciated. 
  In an article slightly predating Levitt’s, Chu and Jiang (1993) examine optimal sanctions 
when there are three types of individuals in terms of wealth levels and a continuum of offenses 
that individuals can commit, each corresponding to a different level of harm.  Because Chu and 
Jiang assume that the fine is proportional to the level of harm, they in effect assume that the 
enforcement authority cannot observe offenders’ wealth levels, though this is not the focus of 
their attention.  Their main point is that, because of marginal deterrence considerations and 
differences among individuals in their responses to imprisonment (wealthier individuals have a 
higher opportunity cost of time in prison), it may be desirable to use imprisonment sentences 
  - 24 - combined with less-than-maximal fines.  Like Levitt, they emphasize the desirability of 
imprisonment sentences relative to fines.  My analysis differs from theirs in that I do not impose 
any restrictions on the choice of fines (aside from wealth constraints), whereas, as noted, they 
assume that the fine is proportional to the level of harm.  Our conclusions differ as well.  I find, 
contrary to Chu and Jiang’s result, that imprisonment sentences should not be used unless the 
party subject to the sentence also makes a monetary payment equal to his wealth level.
19 
  In a companion article — Polinsky (2004) — I derive optimal fines when an offender’s 
level of wealth can be determined after a costly audit.  In contrast to the present analysis, I do not 
consider imprisonment sanctions.  The focus of my other article is on characterizing the optimal 
audit rate and on deriving the optimal fine for misrepresenting one’s wealth level, issues ignored 
here.   
 
VI.  Concluding Remarks 
  The key result from my analysis is that, even though offenders’ wealth levels cannot be 
observed, the optimal mix of sanctions may induce high-wealth offenders to pay more than low-
wealth offenders because they would bear more burdensome (or at least as burdensome) 
sanctions if they did not.  In particular, this result holds whenever imprisonment sentences are 
employed, even if only for offenders who do not pay the fine. 
  I made several simplifying assumptions in order to keep the analysis tractable.  The most 
notable ones are that individuals bear the same disutility from time in prison regardless of their 
                                         
19 Also of some relevance to the present article is the analysis by Lott (1987) of the question whether 
individuals should be allowed to spend freely on their defense in criminal cases.  In his model, offenders bear the 
same imprisonment sentence regardless of their wealth level, and higher-wealth individuals are assumed to suffer 
greater disutility from the sentence.  Lott’s argument is that allowing higher-wealth individuals to spend more on 
  - 25 - wealth level; that individuals are risk-neutral with respect to fines and imprisonment; and that 
there are only two levels of wealth.  I discuss these briefly here and suggest why modifying them 
would not change the point that if optimally chosen sanctions include imprisonment sentences, 
such sanctions will induce higher-wealth individuals to pay more than lower-wealth individuals. 
Suppose that high-wealth individuals have a greater distaste for jail time than low-wealth 
individuals, as the other authors discussed in Section V assumed.  The following argument shows 
that this assumption would not affect my principal conclusion.  Given this assumption, suppose 
the sanctions were such that both groups chose to pay an amount of money equal to the wealth 
level of low-wealth individuals wL and to bear the alternative imprisonment sentence sN  .  This 
outcome could not be optimal, for it would be possible to choose some fine f  > wL and some 
imprisonment sentence s < sN    such that high-wealth individuals are indifferent between the 
primary (f and s) and alternative (wL and sN    )  sanctions.  Hence, they could be induced to choose 
the primary sanctions, resulting in an increase in social welfare due to a reduction in the 
imprisonment sentence borne by high-wealth individuals.  In other words, optimally chosen 
sanctions still will induce high-wealth individuals to pay a fine that exceeds the wealth level of 
low-wealth individuals. 
  If individuals are not risk neutral with respect to fines or imprisonment, the optimal 
sanctions would change, but the same argument used in the preceding paragraph demonstrates 
that my main result would not be affected.  Suppose, given a different set of assumptions about 
the risk preferences of low-wealth and high-wealth individuals (but assuming that all high-wealth 
individuals have the same preferences and all low-wealth individuals have the same preferences), 
                                                                                                                                   
their defense reduces the overdeterrence that otherwise would occur.  For further discussion of this point, see 
Garoupa and Gravelle (2003).  
  - 26 - that the sanctions were such that both groups chose to pay wL and to bear the alternative 
imprisonment sentence sN  .  Again, this outcome could not be optimal, for it would be possible to 
choose some fine f  > wL and some imprisonment sentence s < sN     such that high-wealth 
individuals would be just willing to choose the primary sanctions, thereby lowering 
imprisonment costs.   
If wealth levels varied continuously among individuals, the optimal enforcement system 
would include a menu of choices for offenders — various combinations of fines and 
imprisonment sentences.  Based on reasoning employed in this article, the optimal menu should 
have the property that the sum of the sanctions declines (or at least does not rise) with the fine 
paid, which would induce individuals to pay the highest fine possible.  Specifically, start with a 
menu of sanctions — fines and imprisonment sentences — such that each combination in the 
menu generates the same level of deterrence.  Obviously, the higher the fine, the lower the 
imprisonment sentence.  The social benefit from raising the imprisonment sentences from these 
initial levels would always be greater the higher is the initial sentence since society saves more 
on imprisonment costs by deterring an individual who would have borne a longer sentence.  This 
implies that in the optimal menu the sum of the sanctions declines with the fine paid, causing 
each offender to pay the highest fine he is capable of paying. 
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